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PROPOSED

CHANGES

TO

THE

SHERMAN

ANTI-TRUST

ACT:

retrospect, the conflict
between competition and cooperation or combination is a study in
paradoxes. The earliest cases arose from efforts of tradesmen to
break monopolies granted by the crown; 1 the modern cases find the
government attacking monopolies formed by private interests. One
branch of the government forbids under criminal ban, "every conTHEIR NECESSITY AND VALIDITY-Viewed in

tract, combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade", 2 while
another parallel branch declares "only unreasonable restraints are
unlawful." One group demands more stringent enforcement of the
Anti-Trust laws; another insists upon a reversion to a policy of
Spencerian laissez-faire.
It is the purpose of this note to examine, first, the status of
business in relation to the present Anti-Trust policy, second, the proposed changes, and finally an evaluation of these proposals.3
The historical development of national policy regarding trusts,
monopolies and restraints of trade is well known. 4 Culminating in
Standard Oil Co. v. United States ' and American Tobacco Co. v.

United States,6 the Supreme Court has evolved from the Sherman

Act, which declared illegal, "every contract, combination . . . or

conspiracy in restraint of trade", 7 a rule which tests the legality of a
combination by its reasonableness, and its reasonableness to a notable
degree by its detriment or benefit to the public. Let it not be thought
'Hawkins defined a monopoly as, "an allowance by the king to a particular
person or persons of the sole buying, selling, making -or using of anything
whereby any person is sought to be restrained from any freedom of manufacturing or trading which he had before." I HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN
(1824) 624.
'THE SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT, 26 Stat. 2o9 (i8go), 15 U. S. C. § I
(1926).

' On the relevant subject of State Anti-Trust legislation, see DAvIEs, TRUST
LAWS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION (Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Corporations, 1916) 143-230; JENKS AND CLARK, THE TRUST PROBLEM (1917) 241-253.
The state attitude will be found to closely trace that of the Federal.
'The scope of this note precludes an examination of the Clayton Act and
Federal Trade Commission. For an excellent treatise see HENDERSON, THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1924).
For the view that the Federal Trade
Commission has not proven to be an unquestioned success, see Probst, The
Failure of the Shermnan Anti-Trust Law (1926) 75 U. OF PA. L. REV. 122.
6221 U. S. I, 31 Sup. Ct. 502 (191o).
To understand this growth, compare
with the cited case United States v. Knight Co., 156 U. S. I, 15 Sup. Ct. 249
(I894), and then United States v. Northern Security Co., 193 U. S. 197, 24
Sup. Ct. 436 (19o3).
6223 U. S. io6, 31 Sup. Ct. 632 (91o).
It would appear that the courts
have here formulated and are applying what Mr. Justice Holmes terms "accurately measured social desires", HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1920)
226.
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that the court does not at intervals suffer a partial relapse as in the
recent case of ParamountFamous Lasky Co. v. United States,8 where
an agreement between motion picture distributors to refuse to contract with exhibitors except by contracts having compulsory arbitration clauses was held to be in violation of the Sherman Act; but these
exceptional instances should not obscure the magnitude of the Court's
accomplishment. It has been said that this assimilation by the Court
of progressive economic concepts into the legal system is an accomplishment which will be
"one of the glories of jurisprudence in this and every other
country where the common law rule of law through judicial
decision prevails." 9
The keystone of our economic order has long been thought to
be the principle of competition. Its purpose has been to encourage
initiative, preserve opportunity, and to insure for the public the great
political, social and economic benefits flowing from a competitive
system of industry.' 0 Attendant upon the advancing complexity of
civilization there has been increased recognition of the necessity of
tempering the traditional concept of competition with an element of
cooperation." The situation under existing law will now be examined.
Combinations may be mergers, or, cooperative action by individual units.
Existing Status
A. Mergers
A merger is a vertical or horizontal amalgamation or absorbing
of one business unit by another into a single legal entity. Certainly
in this field it cannot be contended that the Sherman Act has proven
excessively restraining. Big business has become synonymous with
American business. From the year i919 till 1927 the yearly number
'51 Sup. Ct. 42 (1930). Though the fact that arbitration in the moving
picture industry has frequently been subject to attack as not being impartial
may have contributed to this particular result, it is probable that this will end
many attempts by trade associations to enforce compulsory arbitration upon
outsiders. See Note (93o) 39 YALE L. J. 874.
'Montague, Enforcement of Anti-Trust Laws by the Courts or a Commnis-

siom (193o) CXLVII ANNALS 179. Mr. Kirsh has well suggested that this
process of assimilation had its inception when Lord Mansfield began weaving
the customs among merchants into the fabric of the Common Law, KIRSH,

TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, THE LEGAL ASPECT (1928) 26.
" MARSHALL's READINGS ON INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1919) 294, 419, 479, 498,
935; FISHER, ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (i916) 427; also see

address by Herbert Hoover as Secretary of Commerce, KIRSH, supra note 9
at 15.
n MERGERS IN INDUSTRY (National Ind. Conference Board, 1929) 8 et seq.;
TRADE ASSOCIATIONS,

THEIR ECONOMIC

SIGNIFICANCE AND

LEGAL STATUS

(National Ind. Conference Board, 1925) 7-60. Doubtless exercising much influence has been the widespread participation in stock ownership, estimated at
17,000,000.

I RECENT ECONOMtIC CHANGES (President's Conference on Unem-

ployment, 1929) XII.

604

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

of mergers effectuated increased

225

per cent.1 2

Landmarks are the

cases of United States v. United States Steel Co.13 and United States
v. International Harvester Co.,14 in both of which consolidations con-

trolling over 55 per cent. of the industry were upheld. Significant
also is the recent district court decision 15 upholding a recombination
of the Standard Oil Co. of New York and the Vacuum Oil Co., constituents of the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey dissolved in 19o9.
In answer to the query as to the benefit accruing to the public
from these mergers, recent scientific research has established that by
means of superior managerial ability, large scale production, superior
research facilities, and longtime schedules, consolidations of this character have, in many instances, proven of distinct economic benefit to
the community, in particular with regard to productive efficiency,
stimulus to inventive and technical progress, lower prices to consumers and steadier employment for employees." The sound attitude
of the Court is well expressed by Justice McKenna in the case of
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co.7 where there was
upheld a firm having control of 96 per cent. of the shoe machinery
trade:
"The company indeed has magnitude, but it is at once the
result and cause of efficiency, and the charge that it has been
oppressively used is not sustained." I
The purpose of the Sherman Act was to eradicate existing, and
preclude future oppressive trade practices. The last twenty years
of the nineteenth century had seen as an incident of the unprecedented
growth of big business the widespread birth and growth of promotion means, many of which, if not actually fraudulent, were economically unsound. Financial structures were erected with size their
only justification. Monopolies were established to control market
price and production. Local price cutting, boycotts and fraudulent
stock manipulations were widely practiced, and business ethics were
at a minimum.
From the survey in the preceding paragraphs it appears that,
in destroying these practices, efficient and natural methods of business
growth and cooperation have nevertheless been fostered.
"I RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES (National Bureau of Economic Research,
1929) 184.
251 U. S. 417, 40 Sup. Ct. 293 (1919).
14274 U. S. 693, 74 Sup. Ct. 748 (1927).
Discussed in U. S. DAILY, Feb. 9, 1931 page I.
1"MERGERS IN INDUSTRY, supra note II at 17o et seq.
In the large con-

solidation group, it here appears the average price advance has been but onehalf of that in unaffected groups; see also JONES, THE TRUST PROBLEM IN THE
UNITED STATES (1925) 499-542.
17247 U. S. 32, 38 Sup. Ct. 473 (1918) ; see United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Co., 258 U. S. 451, 42 Sup. Ct. 363 (1922).

'Ibid. at 56, 38 Sup. Ct., at

481.

NOTES

B. Trade Associations
An evaluation of the influence of the Sherman Act upon the
cooperative efforts of separate business units, each unit retaining its
individual identity, entails a study of the legal aspects of the modem
trade association.Y

This is a most recent and little known field of

business activity, though it is now estimated that there are in excess
of Iooo such trade associations in being, representing all leading
trade groups. 20 Recognizing the economic worth of these associations, modern jurisprudence has attempted to keep abreast with their
activities, and, to a large degree, has succeeded; though in so doing
the Supreme Court has found it necessary to hold as legal, fact situations 21 which, to many, seemed identical with others declared illegal
only a short while before.22 For the purpose of this note, it must
suffice to catalogue cooperative practices the validity of which has
been sustained, directly or by strong implication: cooperative collection of statistical information as to cost of production,23 and as to
prices at which products have been sold,2 4 uniform cost accounting
27
methods, 25 credit bureau functions, 28 uniform basing point systems,
"0 TRADE AssOcrATION ACTIVITIES (Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, 1927).
Extremely interesting is the correspondence betveen Secretary Hoover and
Attorney General Dougherty, found in JoNEs, TRADE AsSOCIATIoN AcTvinEs
AND THE LAW (1922) 324.
'The National Industrial Conference places the number at one thousand,

TRADE

AssocIATIoNs,

THEIR

EcoNoMIc

SIGNIFICANCE AND

LEGAL

STATUS,

supra note II at 325.
2 Maple Flooring Association v. United States, 268 U. S. 563, 45 Sup. Ct.
578 (1925) ; at page 586 Mr. Justice Stone states "We decide only that trade
associations . . . or corporations which openly and fairly gather and disseminate information as to the cost of their product, the volume of production,
the actual price which the product has brought in past transactions, stocks of
merchandise on hand, approximate cost of transportation from the principal
point . . . and who . . . meet and discuss such information . . . without
reaching any agreement or concerted action with respect to prices or production . . . do not thereby engage in unlawful restraint of commerce."; Cement
Mfgrs. Association v. United States, 268 U. S. 588, 45 Sup. Ct. 586 (1925).
"American Column Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 377, 42 Sup.
Ct. 417 (I921) ; United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U. S. 371, 43

Sup. Ct. 607

(1923).

ASSOCIATION AcrInTIEs, supra note I, at 45; Maple Flooring
Association v. United States, supra note 21, at 568, 45 Sup. Ct., at 58o; KIRsH,
op. cit. supra note 0, at 44 et seq.
24
Supra note 23.
"There is as yet no direct holding on this point. As indicative of validity,
see supra note 23, and Hoover-Dougherty letters, supra note 19.
"Examine Swift Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 25 Sup. Ct. 276
(19o5); Cement Mfgrs. Association v. United States, supra note 21; but an
agreement to refrain from dealing with outsiders without security until adjustment of old contracts is illegal, United States v. First National Pictures, 51
Sup. Ct. 45 (930).
" Maple Flooring Association v. United States, supra note 21, at 570; 45
Sup. Ct., at 58o, but they may not be the basis of illegal price agreements, KIRsH,
Op. cit. suPra note 9, at 185.
" TRADE
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foreign trade activities,28 and agricultural cooperation.2 9 Thus, without impairing the prohibition of any agreement to fix prices or limit
output, the courts have recognized as legal, practices having a recognized social worth.
This, then, is the status in the realms both of actual corporate
amalgamations, and of unit cooperation: while a regulated competition has been preserved, cooperation has been fostered.
Proposed Modifications
A. As to Practicality

Nevertheless changes in fundamental policy have been suggested.
Their purport is, in the main, to amend the Sherman Act in order to
make "utility to the public" the test of legality, to be enforced with
or without a commission having powers analogous to those of the
Interstate Commerce Commission."0
In view of the cooperative practices already established as legal,
it appears that these proposals can but be aimed toward giving legal
sanction to combinations to set prices, or limit output. Though the
abstract attractiveness of allowing combinations with the consent of
an expert commission to set prices may be admitted, the wisdom of
the suggested changes may be questioned on the ground of (i) practical impolicy, and (2) probable constitutional invalidity.
In the first place, a commission empowered to grant exemption
from the legal prohibition of price fixing upon a showing that the
prices set were reasonable, or beneficial to the public would encounter
all of the obstacles inherent in price fixing. If, in determining reasonable price, the formula of cost of production plus a reasonable
profit be adopted, there is the glaring danger of lessened efficiency
due to an assured profit; while to permit the fixing of a price, uniform
in a district or the country as a whole, and adjusted at a high enough
figure to remunerate the marginal producer whose product is necessary to satisfy demand, would incite dissatisfaction on the part of the
consumer.3" Vast problems of valuation would arise. Economic conditions being in a constant state of flux, a price reasonable today may
well be illegal within a month. The experience of an efficient Interstate Commerce Commission, burdened with the railroads, reveals
AcT, 40 Stat. 516 (i9i8), 15 U. S. C.
388 (1922), 7 U. S. C. § 291 (1926).

' WEBB-PoNtERENE
2942 STAT.

§ 61,

62 (1926).

I Carter, Changing Investments and the Anti-Trust Laws (393o) CXLVII
A contrast between the Anti-Trust laws of Foreigncoztatries
and of the United States (193o) CXLVII ANNALS 125; Blackly and Oatman,
Regulated Monopoly versus Enforced Competition; The German Experinent
(393o) CXLVII ANNALS 350; Young, Who shall adinister the Anti-Trust
Laws (1930) CXLVII ANNALS 171.
ANNALS Io3; Levy,

" JONES,

THE TRUST

PROBLEM

IN THE

UNITED STATES

(1921)

Chapter

XX; on the general subject of price control see Rottschaeffer, The Field of Governtnental Price Control (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 438; BYE, APL=ED EcoNO1tlcs
(i928) 248 et seq.

NO TES

in a small degree what would be the overwhelming task of a commission or series of commissions expected to determine reasonable prices
and reasonable quantity of output for business as a whole. Ingrained
in the American mind is a deep fear of bureaucratic supervision
which will for many years prevent embarking on such proposals. 32
B. As to Constitutional Validity
Unmindful of the presence of constitutional limitations existing
under the Constitution, those advocating an amendment to the Sherman Act establishing "Public Benefit" as the test, base their plan
upon that one attempted in Australia.83 In this country, however,
our Fourth and Fifth Amendments have been interpreted as making
unconstitutional any statute requiring obedience to so vague and flexible a standard as "reasonable price." 34 In Cline v. Frink Dairy a
state anti-trust law granting exemption to its operation if the price
were reasonable was held unconstitutional, the court stating:
C'
. the act is so vague and uncertain in its description of what
shalli constitute its criminal violations that it is invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment." This principle would apply with equal force
to a Federal enactment. It may well be doubted whether the presence
of commission approval would remove this flaw. The constitutionality of a statute similar to the ones proposed has not, of course, yet
been before the Court, but a study of the most relevant decisions
reveals that the Court is convinced of the soundness of the philosophy
that progress lies in a natural development from status to contract,
and has faith in the power of competition to solve most economic
problems. Attempts by states and the Federal government to set
prices and wages have not been upheld unless firmly grounded on a
"public interest." 30 The attitude of the Court in this respect is well
37
illustrated by its invalidation of the Kansas Industrial Court Act.
Indicative also are the limitations placed by the Court upon the Federal Trade Commission which, restricting the functions of the Coin'Dickinson, Administrative Law and the Fear of Bureaucracy (1928) 14
A. B. A. J. 513-16, 597, 6o2.
'AUSTRALIAN
INDUSTRIEs PROTECTION Acr (i9o6) as amended by Acts of
i9oS, No. 5, 19o9 No. 26, 191o No. 29, § 4 (1) (a). Under this act price
setting agreements are legal, Attorney General of Australia v. Adelaide Steamship Co. (1913) A. C. 781.
'In United States v. Cohen Grocery, 255 U. S. 8i, 41 Sup. Ct. 298 (1921)
§ 4 of the Lever Act making it unlawful to charge an excessive price for
necessities was held unconstitutional as setting too indefinite a standard. In
Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 267 U. S. 233, 45 Sup. Ct. 295
(1925) this principle was held to apply equally to civil matters.
W,274 U. S.445, 453, 47 Sup. Ct. 68I, 683 (927) ; International Harvester
Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 216, 34 Sup. Ct. 853 (194).
' Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876) ; Tyson and Brother v. Barton, 273
U. S. 428, 47 Sup. Ct. 426 (1927).
"Charles Wolff Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U. S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct. 63o
(1923).
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mission to little more than fact finding, reserve decisions of business
policy and law for the courts. 8 Finally, very significant, is the Court's
firm stand against price fixing agreements under the present law.
Having once adopted the rule of reason, it could, without difficulty,
have upheld agreements setting "reasonable" prices. The holding
of a long line of cases, the leading one of which is United States v.
Trenton Potteries3' is exactly contra to this suggestion.
It must be admitted that there is a degree of undesirable uncertainty as to the application of the Sherman Act to specific combinations, but, as has been pointed out, business has not been unduly
hindered and the latent power arising from the mere existence of
this statute as a deterrent from the notorious practices prevalent at
its adoption cannot be over-estimated.
And so in conclusion, the thesis of this note is that the Supreme
Court has so construed the Sherman Act as to permit economically
sound corporate mergers and most cooperative trade activities short
of price fixing and output limitation. Proposed changes, though not
without merit, are open to attack due to (I) impracticability of operation, and (2) probable unconstitutionality. It may well be that
minor changes as to the establishment of a commission with mere
advisory powers,40 or the granting of exemptions to certain industries
to preserve natural resources -1 would be desirable. 42 They would not
alter the underlying policy of the Anti-Trust Laws.
P.H.R.

THE RIGHT OF A BANK TO PLEDGE ITS ASSETS AS SECURITY FOR
A PUBLIC OR PRIVATE DEPOSIT-In recent years the question whether
or not a bank may pledge its assets to secure a public or private
Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 427, 40 Sup.
'Federal
Ct. .572, .575 (1020) ; McReynolds: "The words unfair method of competition
are not defined by the statute . . . It is for the courts, not the commission,
ultimately to determine as matter of law what they include." Federal Trade
Commission v. Curtis Publishing Co., 26o U. S. 568, 43 Sup. Ct. 220 (I923) ;
HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COalalISSION (1924) 101-3; see DICKINSON,
ADMINISTRATIVE

JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN

THE UNITED STATES

(1929).

3273 U. S. 392, 47 Sup. Ct. 377 (1929) ; Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U. S. 66,
37 Sup. Ct. 353 (917).
oDonovan, The Need for a Commerce Court (i93o) CXLVII ANNALS 138.
'Hervey, Anti-Trust Laws and Conservation of Minerals (i93o CXLVII
ANNALS 67.
' For a view of the light in which the nation's economists view competition
and resale price maintenance, see DOTEN, WHAT ECONOMISTS THINK OF THE
KELLY RESALE PRICE BILL (i93i).
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deposit has leaped into prominence.' It is well at the outset to draw
a distinction between public and private deposits, for considerations
that apply to the one may not apply to the other. For the sake of
clarity the two are better treated separately.
Public Deposits 2
The authorities are in sharp conflict, but the decided weight of
authority, apart from statute, is that a bank has the right ' to pledge
its assets as collateral security for a public deposit. 4 Indeed, of all
'All of the cases but four have been decided in the last decade, and a
great many of these cases within the last five years. Apparently, hitherto
discussion of the matter has appeared only in brief comments as "recent case"
notes. On the topic in general see (1928) 42 HARv. L. REv. 272; (1927) 22
13 MINN. L. REv.
ILL. L. REV. 449; (1928) I:2 MINN. L. REv. 407; (929)
145; (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. 916; Note (193o) 65 A. L. R. 1413, a valuable

compilation of many of the cases.
-Federal Deposits: 34 STAT. 1290 (1907), 12 U. S. C. § 90 (1927) : "All
national banking associations, designated for that purpose by the Secretary of
the Treasury, shall be depositories of public money, under such regulations
as may be prescribed by the Secretary, . . .

The Secretary of the Treasury

shall require the association thus designated to give satisfactory security, by
the deposit of United States bonds and otherwise, for the safekeeping and
prompt payment of the public money deposited with them." For further
statutory law hereon, see 2 MORSE, BANKS & BANKING (6th ed. 1928) §§ 45 II,
245 II; MAGEE, BANKS & BANKING (3rd ed. 1921) § 239; BoLLmS, NATIONAL
BANK AcT ANNOTATED (4th ed. 191o) 84; PRATT, DIGEST OF NATIONAL BANKING LAws (1917) § 328.
By another federal statute the depositories of postal savings funds may
give "such security in public bonds or other securities, authorized by act of
Congress or supported by the taxing power, as the board [of trustees] may
prescribe, approve, and deem sufficient and necessary to insure the safety and
prompt payment of such deposits on demand," PRATT, op. cit. supra, at § 331.
For this reason the question of deposits of federal moneys, and of postal
savings funds, is totally excluded from further discussion. The word "public
funds" as used in the text signifies all moneys of a public nature other than
federal moneys.
"Right" is used in preference to the word "power" in its technical sense,
as being more generic in nature. As used in the text it connotes that such a
pledge may be enforced by the pledgee, and that the bank or its receiver may
never reach the assets pledged, even after insolvency. The same is meant when
a pledge is spoken of as "valid" or "upheld."
'Williams v. Hall, 3o Ariz. 581, 249 Pac. 755 (1926) ("unlawful" deposit
of state moneys) ; Andrew v. Odebolt Savings Bank, 203 Iowa 1335, 214 N. W.
559 (1927) (county funds) ; Richard v. Osceola Bank, 79 Iowa 707, 45 N. W.
294 (189o) (county funds) ; [In the 6 following cases the assets were pledged
to indemnify a surety on a bond given by the latter to secure the deposit:
McFerson v. National Surety Co., 72 Colo. 482, 212 Pac. 489 (1923) (county
funds) ; U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Village of Bassfield, 148 Miss. lO9, 1I4 So.
,26 (1927) (a confusing case) sembk; (i928) 12 MINN. L. REV. 407; Ainsworth v. Kruger, 8o Mont. 468, 260 Pac. lOSS (1927) ; Page Trust Co. v. Rose,
192 N. C, 673, 135 S. E. 795 (1926) (county funds) ; Grigsby v. Peoples' Bank,
158 Tenn. I82, II S. W. (2d) 673 (1928) (state funds); cf. Mothersead v.
U. S. Fidelity etc. Co., 22 F. (2d) 644 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927), certioraridenied
in 276 U. S. 637, 48 Sup. Ct. 421 (1928)] ; PATON, DIGEST OF LEGAL OPINIONS
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the courts which have been confronted with the problem only some
five or six have decided against the existence of such right.' For
brevity's sake these two views will be stamped as the majority and
minority rule respectively. Of those cases establishing the former
rule it may be said, speaking in general, that they have not been
consistent in the theory or technique with which they have obtained
their result. The reasoning used has apparently not compelled the
result, but, on the contrary, leaves the impression of being but a stopgap manufactured to supply the hiatus left between the facts and a
conclusion already reached. Some of the courts have boldly and
tersely adjudicated the issue by mere ipse dixi. Thus, in McFerson
v. Natioial Surety Co.," a bank pledged its assets with a surety to
indemnify the latter on a bond given by the surety to secure a deposit
of county funds. The court upheld the pledge in an opinion covering
one page, 7 including the statement of facts, and not citing a single
authority.
(1921) § 459; see I MORSE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 48, § 63; I BoLLs, MODERN
LAW OF BANKING (1907) 356; cf. PRATT, op. cit. supra note 2, at ii (often
cited erroneously as applicable here). In most of these cases there were
statutes providing for the selection of public depositories and their giving of a
surety bond in order to secure public deposits. The bearing of these statutes
on the problem under discussion is dealt with later in the text. See, also, note
51, infra.
But if the bank is in fact insolvent at the time the pledge is made, then the
transaction is utterly void; and this notwithstanding the utter lack of inala.
ides on the part of all the parties concerned, Rice v. City cf Columbia, 141
S. E. 705 (S. C. 1928) (city and county funds).
'Ark.-La. Highway Co. v. Taylor, 177 Ark. 440, 6 S. W. (2d) 533 (1928);
(928)
42 HARv. L. REV. 272; Commercial Banking & Trust Co. v. Citizens'
Trust & G. Co., 153 Ky. 566, 156 S. W. 16o (1913) (pledge to indemnify
surety-containing a vigorous well-reasoned opinion by Lassing, J. condemning
the practice of pledging as being against public policy) ; Farmers & M. State
Bank v. School District, 174 Minn. 286, 219 N. WV. 163 (1928) ; Farmers State
Bank v. Marshall County, 175 Minn. 363, 221 N. W. 242 (1928) ; (1929) 13
MI-N. L. REv. 145; Divide County v. Baird, 212 N. W. 236 (N. D. 1926);
(1927) 22 ILL. L. REv. 449 (a good note); Foster v. City of Longview, 26
S. W. (2d) 1059 (Tex. 193o), revg Commercial etc. State Bank v. City of

Longview, ii S. W. (2d) 217 (Tex. Civ. App. I928); Austin v. County of
Lamar, 26 S. W. (2d) io62 (Tex. 193o), rev'g Austin v. County of Lamar, ii
S. W. (2d) 553 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) ; see Parks v. Knapp, 29 F. (2d) 547,
550 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928) ; Carter v. Brock, 162 La. 12, 18, 110 So. 71 (1926).
In some of these cases there were statutes allowing certain specified assets to
be pledged, and a pledge of other assets was made. As shown later in the text
the problem is the same as if no such statute existed.
Of course, it makes no difference whether the assets are pledged to induce
the deposit 6 principio, or to prevent a timid and hesitant depositor from withdrawing his money, Farmers State Bank v. County of Marshall, supra. Contra:
Andrew v. Odebolt Savings Bank, supra note 4, semble.
'72 Colo. 482, 212 Pac. 489 (1923).
"For the plaintiff in error it is claimed that the deposit of the collateral
was void as an attempt to prefer one creditor over others, and hence it [the
security pledged] may be recovered. We see no ground for this contention.
"The right of the treasurer to deposit the money in the banks is not involved,
and that right is of course undoubted. There is no question that a bank, in
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In some jurisdictions there are statutes expressly forbidding any
pledge by a bank which has for its sole purpose the securing of a
deposit.' On the other hand, statutes are found which by their wording easily give rise to a construction that the deposit of various public
moneys may be protected by a pledge of general assets of a bank.,
Thus, a Utah statute requires the depositor of certain public funds
to exact "collateral security" for the deposit, and the term "collateral
security" naturally includes the assets of the bank. 10 Shading away
into a neutral zone between each of these contrary poles is found still
a third type of statute, providing that in lieu of a surety bond the
public depositor may demand certain specified securities for the protection of his deposit."' Under these popular statutes the problem
has arisen whether an hypothecation of assets other than those specified in the statute is valid. Such a pledge has been held void by all
the cases, but one, dealing with the question.' 2 It is quite obvious,
however, that the result reached depends upon which end of the
judicial balance one occupies. If one begin with the premise that the
pledging of assets for the securing of public funds is to be stifled,
then it follows that the bank may pledge only those assets which the
statute by express terms allows it to-the statute is to be most strictly
order to secure deposits, may give security for them. The giving of the
indemnifying bonds was within the authority of the banks, and was a matter
of ordinary business. The banks owned the securities pledged to the surety
company, and had full right so to pledge them. It is further undoubted that
when collateral has been pledged as security the pledgor has no right to such

collateral until the purpose of the pledge has been fulfilled. It is unnecessary
to cite authorities on these points."

c. 92, § I;
'IDAHO SESs. LAws (1925) c. 133, § 39; N. D. LAws (1925)
S. D. SEss. LAws (I919) c. 124, p. 1o9; Hirning v. Toohey, 50 S. D. 457, 210
N. W. 723 (1926) ; see PATON, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 46o; (1928) 42 HARv.
L. REv. 272.
'FLA.ComP. GEN. LAws (1928) § 6o79; UTAH ComP. LAws (1917) § 4500;
Pixton v. Perry, 269 Pac. 144 (Utah 1928). See also the cases cited and discussed in note 15, infra.
I Pixton v. Perry, supra note 9.
"ARiz. REV. CODE (1928) c. 60, § :2634 (public funds ingeneral: state,
county, ctiy, etc.) ; ARK.AcTs (2927) No. 182, p. 634; FLA. COMP. GEN. LAws
(1928) § 173 (state funds); MINN. GEN. STAT. (1923) c. 4, § 102 (state
funds); MINN. LAws (2925) c. 173 (county, city, village funds, etc.); Mo.
REv. STAT. (2919) § 9585 (county depositories); MONT. LAws (1923) c. 89
(city, county, town moneys); OKLA. CoMiP. STAT. (1921) § 5727 (county depositories) ; TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. (1925) art. 2529 (state depositories); and
art. 2547 (county depositories).
'Ark.-La. Highway Imp. Co. v. Taylor; Farmers & M. State Bank v.
School District; Farmers State Bank v. County of Marshall; Austin v. County
of Lamar, all supra note 5. Contra: Williams v. Earhart, 34 Ariz. 565, 273
Pac. 728 (1929), adversely criticized in a brief excellent note (1929) 77 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 916.

The Minnesota cases of Farmers & M. State Bank v. School District, and

Farmers State Bank v. County of Marshall, both supra, are now made the law
of Minnesota by statute, MINN- LAws (1927) c. 257, which provides that a

bank may pledge no "assets as security for public deposits other than the
securities made eligible by law for that purpose," (1929) 13 MINN. L. REv. 145.
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construed. If, on the other hand, one begin with the premise that
such pledging is desirable, or at least not obnoxious, then the statute
will be construed as evincing a legislative intent that public funds
be secured, and it is immaterial that the statute is not complied withthe cardinal purpose of the statute is that the deposit be secured. In
essence, therefore, these cases present virtually the same problem as
would arise if no statute at all were involved. A half-way statute
of this type, providing that "in lieu of said surety bond, or in addition thereto" certain securities might be taken by the depositor, has
been construed to mean that when the bond is not large enough to
cover the deposit, and only then, the amount of the deficiency may
be made up of the assets specified. 13 It has been intimated that such
a statute belonging to this general category has reference only to
those banks which are insolvent at the time 14-a most absurd view.
Some of the cases which have in a general way reached the result
of the majority view, because of peculiar statutory law, or otherwise,
are clearly distinguishable.' 5 Much confusion has resulted from not
observing this, and citing them as being in accord with the majority
rule. Some of these cases are treated elsewhere.' 6
Sureties that have secured a public deposit by a bond have frequently exacted from the depository a pledge of assets as indemnity.
The cases dealing with this precise question have been almost
unanimous in holding that such a pledge was valid and could be en3Maryland

Casualty Co. v. Okmulgee County, 128 Okla. 58, 26o Pac.

1112

(1927).

" Citizens' State Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 98 Kan. 109, 157 Pac. 392 (1916).
' Thus-First Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Town of Palm Beach, 96 Fla.
247, 117 So. 9oo (1928) : the court upheld a pledge of assets given, in addition
to a surety bond, to secure the plaintiffs' deposits, because those statutes requiring certain state officials to deposit state moneys in those banks offering
the best inducement as to interest and security "must be construed to be a
recognition by the State of Florida of the authority of State banks, . . . to
pledge collateral security to protect deposits of public moneys and thereby
establish a public policy which should be given weight by the courts of this
State when dealing with that question."
City of Portland v. State Bank of Portland, lo7 Ore. 267, 214 Pac. 813
(1923) : a statute forbade the pledging of assets for the securing of deposits,
except that a deposit of public funds might be secured by the pledge of "the
securities required by law and not otherwise." A city ordinance provided for
the securing of municipal deposits by requiring the depositories of city moneys
to pledge certain assets. Held, that a pledge made in accordance with the
ordinance was valid since such a pledge was one required by law, and therefore
came within the statute.
Cameron v. Christy, 286 Pa. 405, 133 Atl. 551 (1926): under a statute
conferring upon certain banks the power "to receive deposits of money and
other personal property and issue their obligations therefor" it was held that
such a provision implies a power to pledge assets as collateral security for the
deposit of county funds. Accord: Cameron v. Allegheny County Home, 287
Pa. 326, 135 Atl. 133 (1926). That this was but the legal peg on which the
court hung its decision is quite evident from the language of the opinion (an
excerpt from which is quoted in note 31, infra).
"In note 15, supIra

NOTES

forced by the surety. 17 Where the minority view prevails, d fortiori
such a pledge would be condemned. Nor does it necessarily follow
that the majority view sanctions such a pledge, having for its sole
purpose the indemnification of the surety. In support of these
hypothecations the contention has been advanced, that since such a
pledge could have been made directly to the depositor, then it should
be upheld when made to the surety, for the latter would be subrogated to such securities upon payment of the amount of the bond.'
This argument can have force only if in fact a pledge has been directly made to the depositor and the latter holds the assets, for if the
depositor has failed to exact a pledge, then there would be nothing
to which the surety could become subrogated after it had been compelled to pay upon the surety bond. The surety may substitute itself
for the creditor (depositor), and if the latter has no pledge, it is too
clear for cavil that the surety has none, nor is it of any avail to argue
To allow
that the depositor might have obtained such a pledge.'
such a practice is to make the business of surety companies, one
depending quintessentially on selectivity of risks, an enviably lucrative
one.
Before passing on to a discussion of the theories underlying the
divergent views it is of interest to note that in connection with the
matter under discussion there are only two cases dealing with national
banks, Parks 71. Knapp,20 a federal case, and a South Dakota case.2 '
In both the pledge was given to a surety company as indemnity in
case of loss on such surety's bond. These cases are unsatisfactory,
however, and do not raise the issue squarely, since in both the pledge
was made while the bank was insolvent. All the other cases concern
state banks, "trust companies," or other banks. Likewise, there are
only two Federal cases on the question under discussion, the Parks
case,
just mentioned, and Mothersead v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty
Co. 2 2 In the latter case a pledge of assets which the depository might
' The cases are cited in note 4, supra. Apparently the only case contra is
that of Comm. B. & T. Co. v. Citizens' T. & G. Co., supra note 5.
But if the bank is insolvent at the time the pledge to the surety is made,

then the result is alter, the pledge is utterly void, as constituting an unlawful
preference, Parks v. Knapp, 29 F. (2d) 547 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928), certiorari

denied in 278 U. S. 66o (1928) ; First Nat. Bank of Huron v. Interstate S. Co.,
227 N. W. 479 (S. D. 1929) [both these cases under 12 U. S. C. § 91 (1927)] ;
and this notwithstanding perfect good faith and the utter absence of fraud on
the part of the bank, Schornick v. Butler, 172 N. E. i8i (Ind. 193o) (a pledge
to surety of assets other than those which the depository was permitted by
statute to make directly to the depositor of public moneys to secure the deposit).
" Mothersead v. U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 22 F. (2d) 644, 653 (C. C. A. 8th,
1927), certioraridenied in 276 U. S. 637, 48 Sup. Ct. 421 (1928).
i BRANDT, SuRETYSHip & GUARANTY (3rd ed. 19o5) § 349.
-929 F. (2d) 547 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928), certioraridenied in 278 U. S. 66o
(1928).
" First Nat. Bank of Huron v. Interstate S. Co., supra note 17.
--22 F. (2d) 644 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927), certiorari denied in 276 U. S. 637,

48 Sup. Ct. 421

(1928).
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have made directly to the depositor, by virtue of a statute allowing a
public depository to pledge certain specified assets, was made to indemnify a surety in case of loss on the latter's bond. The pledge was
upheld. It is obvious, however, that the remark made of the Parks
case, that it does not squarely raise the issue under discussion, is
applicable to the Mothersead case.
It is now conceded law that a bank has the corporate power to
23
borrow money and to hypothecate its assets to secure the loan.
Arguing with this point as a premise, many of the courts sustaining
the majority view have used the following syllogism:
(I) A bank may pledge its assets to secure a loan; (2) A deposit
is,as a matter of law, a loan; (3) therefore, a bank may pledge its
assets to secure a [public] deposit.2 4 This has been a favorite argument, and much verbiage has been spent upon it. The fault lies in the
minor premise, for a deposit is most clearly not a loan. While it is
true that the result of both transactions is the relationship of debtor
and creditor, that is the only similarity between the two. and apart
from this the two are different to their very roots. The reasoning
that a deposit and a loan are the same results from accentuating this
sole similarity between the two. That a debtor-creditor relationship results from both transactions is mere legis accidens, and by no means
warrants the conclusion that the two are alike for all purposes.- In
a recent Minnesota case which refused to sanction a pledge of assets
other than those specified in a statute, Judge Stone shows the fundamental differences between a deposit and a loan in sharp telling language: 26
"Deposits are attracted by the strength of a bank, whereas
its borrowings are compelled by weakness or other adverse circumstance. .

.

. Large deposits signify health, and large bor-

rowings banking disease. Springing from opposite causes, the
two by their existence signify opposite conditions-deposits the
normal, and borrowings the abnormal. M\Ioreover, the antithesis
holds to the end; for the withdrawal of a deposit is a loss,
whereas the payment of a loan is a gain. Deposits continued
and increased evidence banking success, whereas borrowings con'Auten v. U. S. Nat. Bank of N. Y., 174 U. S.125, i9Sup. Ct. 628 (1899) ;
Citizens' Bank v. Bank of Waddy, 126 Ky. 169, 2O3 S. W. 249 (19o7) ; Carter
v. Brock, supra note 5 (by statute); I MORSE, BANKS & BANKING (6th ed.
1928) § 16o; I BOLLES, MODERN LAW OF BANKING (0907) 355; 4 THoMPSOi,
CORPORATIONS (1896)
§ 4748.
'Williams v. Hall; Grigsby v. Peoples' Bank, both supra note 4; Comm.
etc. State Bank v. Longview, supra note 5. Contra: Divide County v. Baird,
Ark.-La. Highway Co. v. Taylor, both supra note 5.
'Take the following homely example: The thirst may be quenched by
beverages other than water, but because both wine and water quench the thirst,
no one would contend that the two were the same thing, or that they were
productive of the same effects in all other respects.
'Farmers & M. State Bank v. School District, supra note 5, at 292, 217
N. W. at i65.

NOTES

tinued and increased portend failure. Save in the relation of
debtor and creditor common to both, the two are different in
their very incident-not only different, but opposed in origin, in
purpose, and in effect."
Likewise, a deposit is primarily for the benefit of the depositor,
while a loan is for the benefit of the borrower.2 Those statutes creating depositors' guaranty funds expressly differentiate between a
loan and a deposit.28 That a deposit is not a loan has been held or
intimated in many cases not dealing with the problem of pledging
of assets.2
The slight handful of cases constituting the minority view have
rested their decisions stanchly upon the vague ground of public policy,
refusing to consider the power to pledge in order to secure depositors
as one legitimately incidental to the proper conduction of the business
of banking. It is asserted that to allow the bank the power to pledge
its assets for the securing of a public patron as an incidental power is
against public policy for two reasons: (i) it enables the bank in
effect to prefer one creditor over another, and, in the event of insolvency, "to protect the favored few at the expense of the equally
deserving many"; (2) deposits are induced often by the financial
statements of a bank, and to allow "secret pledging" is to allow the
bank to procure patrons by misrepresentation-a palpable fraud. It
is also pointed out that such a practice will not survive the light of
publicity.30 Counsel have invariably propounded like arguments to
those courts adhering to the opposite view, but these courts have
attempted-quite ineffectually-to check them each time they were
advanced. It is expressly denied that such a practice should be con-

'Hunt v.
(1927)

'Leach

Hopley, i2o Iowa 695, 95 N. W. 205 (1903).
27 CoL L. REv. 88.
v. Bazely, 201 Iowa 337, 2o7 N. V. 374 (1926) ; Elliott

v. State

Bank, 128 Iowa 275, io3 N. V. 777 (9o5) (Deposits "are neither loans, nor
bailments in the strict sense of the term. A deposit is a transaction peculiar
to the banking business.") ; Allibone v. Ames, 9 S.D. 74, 68 N. NV. i65 (896) ;
i Bou.Ls, op. cit. sup-ra note 23, at 430; see Boyd v. Schneider, 131 F. 223, 226
(C. C. A. 7th, i9o4) ; Law's Estate, 144 Pa. 499, 507, 22 Atl. 831, 832 (1891) ;
cf. Robinson v. Gardner, 18 Gratt. 509 (Va. 1868) ; Pendleton v. Commonwealth,
I10 Va. 229, 65 S. E. 536 (i9o9). Contra: I MORSE, op. cit. supra note 23, at
§ 63, n. 3, § 289 (the source of much of the confusion hereon).
' "A conclusive test is that no bank can make a practice of securing deposits by pledging assets and live. A few such transactions made known to its
clientele would put any bank out of business..... No bank could long survive such an expos6. The very offer of collateral for his deposit would send
any discreet and informed depositor elsewhere. So, if the practice of securing
deposits by pledge of assets is resorted to at all, it must be done secretly. That
is enough to condemn it. Any power, the exercise of which will not stand the
light of publicity, cannot be allowed to banks. The argument that a bank has
the implied power [to secure deposits by pledge of assets], one that if used
openly is ruinous and must be resorted to clandestinely, if at all, refutes itself."
Stone, J. in Farmers & M. State Bank v. School District, supra note 5, at 289,
290, 219 N. W. at 165.
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demned,31 and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has even suggested that it should be encouraged.32 Likewise, to decide, in the
event of insolvency, that such a pledge to the custodian of public
moneys was void would be to say that banks which had become the
depositories of public funds might use them to pay private claims"a conclusion not to be countenanced." 33 Why, one is not told.
In answer to the second argument, it is said the injustice may
be easily obviated by requiring the bank to show in its financial reports what amount of assets have been hypothecated. 3' This is
quaint reasoning: it takes as a stated fact that which ex hypothesi is
to come after the decision as a palliative to depositors, and it forgets
that for the purposes of the case before the court the depositors have
not in fact had the benefit of a financial statement which showed the
amount of assets pledged. The argument used would have force
only if the practice suggested had in fact been established. When
similar cases come before it, the court will doubtless reason in the
same fashion, although in the meantime no action has been taken in
the manner suggested.
There has also been a suggestion advanced in two or three cases
that the private depositor has no complaint against such pledging
because the amount received as a deposit is equal to the assets hypothecated. ' , En bref, that portion carved out of the bank's assets by a
pledge to the depositor is replaced by the deposit. While this answer
to the matter is tinged with the semblance of persuasion, it is not
satisfactory. In the first place, it is quite manifest thar the depositor
may well require more security than an amount which will barely
' "It was argued by counsel at the trial that the pledging of assets by state
banks and trust companies to secure deposits by public officers is a general
practice throughout the State. In view of this common practice, which is one
to be encouraged rather than discouraged, we fail to see how other depositors
. . . have any standing to complain. This general practice also answers the
argument that the pledging of the bonds to secure one depositor in preference
to the others is against public policy. It surely cannot be contrary to public
policy to follow a practically universal custom established by long usage and
good business, and which has likewise the sanction of the federal government
in the deposit of its funds in national banks. In fact, we find it difficult to see
in what respect an arrangement intended to safeguard public money on deposit
in banks could be deemed contrary to public policy. The greater the precautions

taken, the better the public is secured," Frazer, J. in Cameron v. Christy, supra
note 15, at 409, 133 Atl. at 552.

'See note 31. supra.
'City of Portland v. State Bank, 107 Ore. 267, 276,

214

Pac. 813, 816

(1923).
'First Am. Bank etc. Co. v. Palm Beach, 96 Fla. 247, 253, 117 So. 900,
903 (1928) ; Grigsby v. Peoples' Bank, supra note 4, at 193, ii S. W. (2d)

at 676.
"As pointed out in Trust Co. v. Rose [supra note 4] the liabilities of the
bank are not increased by the assignment since the deposit, which was beneficial
to the bank, was equal to the assets pledged," Grigsby v. Peoples' Bank, supra
note 4, at 192, ii S. W. (2d) at 676.

NOTES

cover his deposit. Secondly, the assets are clearly the bank's property, whereas the deposit received is not, notwithstanding the "legal
title" is in the bank, since the depositor may draw thereon. While
the pledge remains static, the amount of the deposit may dwindle,
and matters are allowed to remain in statu quo by the bank, in the
hope that carus cliens will soon swell his deposit; and in the meantime the bank has virtually deprived itself of a profitable slice of its
property, to the detriment of its private depositors. Further, it must
be borne in mind that the validity of the pledge is assailed only after
the bank has become insolvent. This contention, as well as the others
advanced in support of the majority rule, oblivious of this fact, seem
to be based on the thought that the validity of the transaction is to be
determined primarily from looking at the conditions existent either
when the pledge was made, or the private customer deposited his
money with the bank. Naturally, while the bank is in good condition
there is little fault to find with such a pledge. However, the bank
may well pledge its assets after it has received the private customer's
deposit; and, above all, the very reason why the pledge should be
condemned is because of the ever-present contingency that the bank
may become insolvent, and because in that event the unsecured depositors are deprived of assets which should go to the payment of
their claims. Therefore, when, after the insolvency of the bank, the
court is called upon for the first time to pass upon the validity of the
pledge, it is futile to look at the transaction as one isolated in time,
or to try to determine by segregation into temporal compartments
that which should not be so treated.
It may also be argued that, since the loss of public funds entails
a loss upon the public, in the final analysis the majority rule is sustainable. The argument is weak because "public" is used equivocally.
Thus, if county taxes are completely lost by the failure of a bank
wherein they were deposited, the loss falls upon the whole county;
but if the county is given a preference by a pledge, then the loss falls
not upon the whole county, but upon that portion of the county which
chance to have been depositors in the bank at the time. Therefore,
it is to be guilty of a sophism, and not strictly true, to say with the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that "the greater the precautions
taken the better the public is secured." 36
Those cases sustaining the majority view have been inconclusive
in their analysis of the issue. It is quite true that the argument used
as the basis of the minority is that of public policy, and that public
policy is too chameleon-like and too odiously vague a term. However,
the slight but imponderable argument that the practice of pledging
upheld by the majority view tends to safeguard the public patron of
a bank at the expense of the private depositor, has not yet been
effectually answered, and there seems to be much therein. This contention has been scotched, not killed. Further, it is interesting to
" See note 31, supra.
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note that the first two cases refusing to sanction the hypothecating
of assets as security for public deposits were both long, well-reasoned
and forceful cases,' 7 whereas the first two cases which lie at the core
of the majority rule are weakly brief and puny, reaching their decisions by the mere force of assertion.3 8 The majority rule has gathered
bulk in its course, but the weakness of the source still lingers in all
the decisions which have aligned themselves with the majority.
Perhaps, the majority view may be defended by the following
argument, based on the sovereign's right to priority. Although this
argument is not expressly used or relied on as a justification by the
way of analogy, it may well be that, because the principle of the
sovereign's right to priority is so well settled in the common law of
England and in most of our states, it has had a tacit influence, or has
even been taken for granted: At common law the Crown by force
of prerogative right was entitled to priority over general creditors in
the estate of an insolvent debtor. 9 This common law doctrine has
been generally accepted with favor by our states, 40 and in accordance
therewith it has been held repeatedly that where state funds are on
deposit in a bank which becomes insolvent, the state has a preference,
as a prerogative right, over the unsecured creditors; and, following
the general rules of the law of suretyship, 1 these cases further hold
that a surety who has been compelled to discharge his obligation on
the surety bond to the state is entitled to be subrogated to the state's
priority.42 The Federal government has attained the same rule by
Comm. B. & T. Co. v. Citizens' T. & G. Co.; Divide County v. Baird,
both supra note 5.
' Richards v. Osceola Bank; McFerson v. Nat. Surety Co., both supra
note 4.
'Co. LITT. * 131 b, I BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 239 et seq.; see 3
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3rd ed. 1923) 458, and for a very
succinct account of the prerogative from the historical standpoint, see ADAMTS,
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1921) 78f.
The doctrine is often, and erroneously, said to rest on the maxim, Thesaurus
HoLDSWORTH,

Regis est vinculum pacis et bellorum nermus.
34 W. VA. L. Q.
40 Crane, A Royal Prerogative in the United States (1928)
317, 321; see (1929) 2 So. CALIF. REv. 298; (1929) 42 HARv. L. REv. 442. The
following cases are in the minority in refusing to recognize the doctrine: Md.
Casualty Co. v. Rainwater, 173 Ark. 103, 291 S. W. 1003 (1927); Board of
Freeholders v. State Bank of N. B., 29 N. J. Eq. 268, 3o N. J. Eq. 311 (1828);
N. C. Corp. Comm. v. Citizens' Bank, 193 N. C. 513, 137 S. E. 587 (1927).
' 5 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 2351; I BRANDT,
loc. cit. supra note 19; STEARNS, SURETYSHIP (2d ed. I9,5) § 248: "If the debt
which the surety pays is entitled to priority, the creditor's right to such priority
inures to the surety."
I Aetna Acc. & Liab. Co. v. Miller, 54 Mont. 377, I70 Pac. 76o (I9i8);
U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Carnegie Trust Co., 148 N. Y. Supp. 8o4, 161 App.
Div. 429 (914), af'd, 213 N. Y. 629, lo7 N. E. 1o87 (914); Woodward v.
Sayre, go W. Va. 295, Iio S. E. 689 (1922). Contra: In re So. Phila. State
Bank's Insolvency, 295 Pa. 433, 145 Atl. 520 (1929), criticized adversely in
78 U. OF PA. L. REV. 120. In re Farmers' State Bank, 174 Minn. 583,
(929)
These two cases last cited seem to present
219 N. W. 916 (1928) (by statute).
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means of statute.4 If, then, the state is ultimately to have a preference, what difference does it make whether it realizes the enjoyment
of this preference by force of its prerogative right of priority after
the insolvency of the bank, or by receiving a pledge of assets from
the same bank, and enforcing the same after the failure of the latter?
The result to the other depositors is identical. There is but little
doubt that this analogy adds much weight to the majority rule, so
far as it is in fact sustainable. But there have been many inroads
made upon the concept of the sovereign's right to priority, and the
doctrine has been shorn of much of its archaic potency. Thus, the
sovereign may waive its right to a preference, and such preference
is waived by statutes providing for the selection of depositories and
the manner in which the latter shall secure the public depositor." And
the right is lost not only by a general assignment for the benefit of
creditors, 45 but also by-the appointment of a receiver," or when 4a7
bank is being liquidated under statutory process by a state officer.
Of course, the efficacy of a pledge is not impaired by the occurrence
of any of these things.
Above all, the prerogative right to priority is a metaphysical
entity peculiar to the concept of sovereignty, and is not divisible
among the component constituents of the Commonwealth, such as a
county or municipal corporation. 48 It is clear, therefore, that to ata very recent tendency to break away from the settled rule. Apparently, it is
felt that a surety company should be held to take the risks incidental to its
business, and is not to be given a preference which is peculiarly the state's.
This seems a desirable result, indeed.
3
STAT. 676 (i799),
i U. S. C. § 193 (1926) ; applied to the case of an
insolvent bank in State ex rel. Davis v. Kilgore State Bank, 112 Neb. 856, 201
N. W. 9o (924).
" it re Central Bank, 23 Ariz. 574, 205 Pac. 915 (1922) ; U. S. Fid. & Guar.
Co. v. McFerson, 78 Colo. 338, 245 Pac. 728 (1925) ; In re Holland Banking

Co., 313 Mo. 307, 281 S. W. 702 (1926) ; Nat. Surety Co. v. Morris, 34 Wyo.
134, 241 Pac. lO63 (1925) ; see Nat. Surety Co. v. Pixton, 6o Utah 289, 298,
Contra: Booth v. State of Georgia, 131 Ga. 750, 63
208 Pac. 878, 881 (1922).
So. 5o2 (igo8); Am. Surety Co. v. Pearson, 146 Minn. 342, 178 N. W. 817
(192?) ; see Booth v. Miller, 237 Pa. 297, 3o7, 85 Atl. 457, 46o (1912).
" State v. Foster, 5 Wyo. 199, 38 Pac. 926 (1894).
"State v. First State Bank, 22 N. M. 661, 167 Pac. 3 (97) (under a
statute providing that the title of the insolvent's property should vest in the
receiver upon the latter's appointment). Cotras: Aetna Co. v. Miller, supra
note 42 (perhaps distinguishable since the court said that the receivership did
not divest the insolvent's title-sed quaere) ; Marshall v. New York, 254 U. S.
380, 4I Sup. CL 447 (1920) (because "the priority is a lien in the broad sense").
"Aetna

Cas. & Surety Co. v. Moore, io7 Wash. 99, 181 Pac. 40 (1919);

see Crane, A Royal Prerogativein the United States (1927) 34 W. VA. L. Q.
317, 324, -. 48.
SAetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Bramwell, 12 F. (2d) 307 (D. Ore. 1926)
(county) ; Glynn County v. Terminal Co., ioi Ga. 244, 28 S. E. 604 (1897) ;
Bignell v. Cummins, 69 Mont. 294, 222 Pac. 797 (1923) (county); In re
Northern Bank, 85 Misc. 594, 184 N. Y. Supp. 70 (914), aff'd, 212 N. Y. 608,
io6 N. E. 749 (1914) (city); Calhoun County v. Mathews, 99 W. Va. 483, "29
Contra: Leach v. U. S. Bank, 213 N. W. 528 (Iowa 1927)
S. E. 399 (1925).

(county).
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tempt to justify the majority rule by analogy to the prerogative right
to priority is futile so far as any public funds other than state moneys
are concerned. Most of the cases that have adhered to the majority
rule have been instances of county funds.
Doubtlessly, the fact that public funds are involved has largely
shaped the growth of the majority view. That it is the policy of our
law to secure the deposits of a bank's public customers is clear from
the popularity of those statutes providing for the selection of public
depositories and the giving by the latter of the ubiquitous surety bond
as security for the deposit. However, that it is the equally clear policy
of our law to protect the general private customers of a bank is
patent from the whole trend of modern banking legislation: witness
the statutes establishing depositors' guaranty funds, 9 the imposition
of double liability upon stockholders, the publication of reports, and
so forth.5" Lying at the root of the varietism on the question of
pledging is this biplex of conflicting interests. The latter interest,
viz., the protection of the private customer, should prevail. It is
indeed true that those statutes providing that public deposits be secured by a surety bond evince a legislative desire to protect such
deposits, but they show a legislative intent to protect the public
1
Likewise,
moneys in the manner specified, that is, by a surety bond.
the maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, is a well-established
rule of statutory construction, "12 and, while the maxim ought to be
49KANS. REV. STAT.
LAWS (1925)

§§

§ 9. Miss. LAWS (922) c. 172, §§ 36, 37;
I; c. 30, § 12; N. D. LAWS (923) C. 200, § 0;
§§ 4166, 4175, repealed, OKLA. LAWS (1923) § 0;
arts. 437, 446, 447; WASH. COMP. STAT. (Reming-

(1923)

C. 28, §
OKLA. COMP. STAT. (1921)
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. (1925)
3293, 3309.
ton, 1922)
NE.

A statute providing for a depositors' guaranty fund is clearly constitutional, Assaria State Bank v. Dolley, 219 U. S. 121, 31 Sup. Ct. i89 (9,0);
First State Bank v. Smith, 49 S. D. 518. 2o7 N. W. 467 (1926) ; further cases
collected in I MORSE, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 13, n. 2, an exhaustive note collecting all the law which has grown about the subject.
'0 See (1927) 22 ILL. L. REV. 449, 450.
"In Grigsby v. Peoples' Bank, 158 Tenn. 182, I S. W. (2d) 673 (1928),
a case sustaining the majority view, the court said of a statute providing for
the selection of state depositories, and the giving by them of a surety bond to
secure deposits, that "this evinces a legislative intent to require security for
State funds." Though not expressed ipsis verbis the same thought seems to
run through some of the other cases in accord with the instant case. The
fallacy is pointed out in the text.
But in Divide County v. Baird, 212 N. W. 236, 242 (N. D. 1926), a case
contra, the court said: "We are not disposed to read into the depository law a
purpose to safeguard the interest of a public patron of a bank at the expense of
the private citizen who deposits his savings therein."
BLAcK, INIERPRETATION OF LAW (1896) § 64; ENDLICH, INTERPRETATION
§§ 397-399. For extreme cases where the maxim was
OF STATUTES (1888)
applied, see Buerfening v. Buerfening, 23 Minn. 563 (1877) ; Ristine v. Ristine,
4 Rawle 459 (Pa. 1834) (where Kennedy, J. applied the maxim with the
vengeance of a mathematical axiom).
The other maxim of statutory construction, expressum facit cessare taciturn,
also applies here.

NOTES

applied with discretion and caution, here, in view of the conflicting
interests involved, it should apply with telling force. Since the protection afforded the private depositor also comes from the legislature,
those statutes providing for a surety bond should be so construed
as to effectuate the purpose of those other statutes which protect the
private depositor. The conflicting interests are both appeased if the
public customer receive a statutory bond: the public deposit is adequately secured, and the practice is not deleterious to the private
clients of the depository.
Irrecusably, the abstract and generic nature of the term "public"
has here, as it has often done elsewhere in the law, played a militant
r6le. There are those who are prone to regard the public as a concept, something lying above and beyond, and vaster than, the various
individuals who make up the political groups such as the state or the
county; and the terms "public," "state," "public funds" and epithets
of that ilk naturally acquire a deep significance.' 3 But the tide has
turned, and is running strong the other way. The accent is placed
not on the whole, but on the parts; not on the "state," but on the
individual citizens composing it; not on the "public," but on the
single units that form it-on the individual. " So, the individual
depositor's right to protection should be considered as primal and
important as that of the depositor of public funds, and the savings
of the citizen, whether won by toil or commercial pursuit, should be
"For example: "This case has been argued largely as if it were one be-

tween private individuals; but it is not. . . . This is a suit by a state for an
injury to it in its capacity of quasi-sovereign. In that capacity the state has
an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, . . . If any
such demand is to be enforced this must be notwithstanding the hesitation that

we might feel if the suit were between private parties," Holmes, J. in Georgia
v. Tenn. Copper Co., 2o6 U. S. 230, 237, 27 Sup. Ct. 6M8, 61g (i9o6).

But Harlan, J. in his concurring opinion was decidedly against such reasoning. He said (p. 240, 27 Sup. Ct. at 62o) : "If this were a suit between private
parties, and if, under the evidence, a court of equity would not give the
plaintiff an injunction, then it ought not to grant relief, under like circumstances,
to the plaintiff, because it happens to be a state . . . Georgia is entitled to the
relief sought, not because it is a state, but because it is a party which has
established its right to such relief by proof." See also note 55, infra.
"See the language of Harlan, J. quoted supra note 53, and Stone, J.'s
statement, infra note 55. In this the law but telescopes the like tendency in all
fields of culture: politics, economics, philosophy [note Kantian offshoots like
Pragmatism], etc. Thus, Croce in his modern and brilliant political essays

well voices the tendency when he departs from his predecessors in defining the
state as the very group of individuals constituting it, the aggregate itself, rather

than the conceptual something which results from taking the individuals

singulatin.
So, the capacious extent to which federal cases have gone in holding
"property" taxable is now notorious. But even this aggressiveness has lost
some of its edge, and it is becoming gradually understood that even the private
individual has some interest in the fortune he has accumulated as against the
government's desire to see its coffers full.
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held as dear as public moneys."'

That a court may legislate "within

6
the interstices" is eminently proper, but there are limits. It is
desirable sometimes to unleash and put into play the oft-vaunted
theory that the law is democratic. The ancient view of the court as
the servant of the state," or the political subdivisions thereof is no
longer stressed, and the present tendency is to grade the rights of the
individual and those of his sovereign on the same scale.

Private Deposits
In many jurisdictions the statutes are clear to the effect that
any pledge of its assets by a bank to secure a private depositor is ipso
facto void. 58 However, it has been held in a comparatively recent
Minnesota case that a depositor of private moneys may protect him59
Likewise, a pledge
self by demanding a surety bond from the bank.
of assets to secure a private depositor has been upheld by the Supreme
Court of Illinois, in Ward v. Johnson," and by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, in Al v. Rhoads." Both these cases are half a
century old, and will doubtless be repudiated either by statute or subsequent judicial decision. The writer has been able to find only one
recent case, in South Carolina, apparently to the same effect, and
' "The title of government to its moneys has no sanctity superior to or
different from that of the individual. In the absence of statute or the special
obligations of trusteeship, a depository is under the same obligation to repay
the one as the other-the right of the citizen is not inferior to that of his government," Stone, J. in Farmers State Bank v. Marshall County, 175 Minn. 363,
365, 221 N. W. 242, 243 (1928).
113f, et passin.
"6 CARDOZo, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921)

" See

HEWART, THE NEW DEsPoTIs I (1929) 102-142.
c. 133, § 39; MINN. LAWS (1927) c. 257;
(1925)
N. D. LAWS (1925) C. 92, § I; S. D. LAws (1919) c. 124, p. 1o9; ORE. SESS.
LAws (1921) c. 17, p. 45; UTAH Coip. LAWS (1917) § ioo6. A very popular
' IDAHO SEss. LAWS

type of statute is often found, providing that no preference shall be given any
depositor by a pledge of assets, and then creating an exception in favor of
public deposits. E. g., KAN. REV. STAT. (1923) c. 9, § 142.
A fortiori, a pledge made while the bank is insolvent is absolutely void,
Smith v. Continental State Bank, Ii F. (2d) 907 (D. Minn. 1925); Porter v.
Insurance Co., 45 Idaho 522, 263 Pac. 632 (1928) [in both these cases the
decision was rested solely on statutes forbidding pledges (see supra), the court
not noticing the fact of insolvency] ; Julius v. State ex rel. Walcott, 113 Okla.
7, 237 Pac. 6o5 (1925) ; Mortgage Loan Co. v. Townsend, 152 S. E. 878 (S. C.
193o); Farmers' Say. Bank v. Bergin, 52 S. D. I, 216 N. W. 597 (1927)
senible; 53 S. D. 396, 220 N. W. 859 (1928).
"Leonard v. First State Bank, 168 Minn. 28, 209 N. W. 631 (1926) (bond
given to depositor to prevent him from withdrawing his checking account).
0095 I1. 215 (188o), but the transaction involved was perhaps a loan to the
bank, and not a deposit.
- 84 Pa. 319 (1877).

NOTES

resting on rather peculiar facts.12 This case is to be taken with
singular caution and not to be followed. The general attitude of the
law, as shown by the statutes mentioned above and the cases decided
thereunder, is rigidly set against this case. Of course, if the favorite
argument of the majority view, that a deposit is a loan, is followed
to its logical end, the argument applies to private as well as public
deposits. But syllogisms are torn down as easily as they are built up,
and the courts will find some way of escape.
B.F.C.

TRUSTEE'S RIGHT TO EXONERATION AND REIMBURSEMENT

A trustee is generally treated as a principal rather than an agent for
the purpose of dealing with third persons in the administration of
the trust estate.2 It follows, therefore, that without specific terms of
' Peurifoy v. Westminster Loan Co., 145 S. E. 7o6 (S. C. 1928). The case
contains a labyrinth of facts, and the actual decision and its reasons in the
opinion cover less than a page: After the bank had been in a failing condition
for several weeks, a depositor deposited a certain sum under an agreement
that the bank would give security therefor later. The depositor acted in utter
good faith and knew nothing of bank's condition. Certain notes to be given as
security were set aside by the bank, and later turned over to the bank examiner,
who was to pass on the security. Shortly thereafter the bank came into the
hands of the receiver. Held, that the depositor had a "lien" on the notes set
aside, and that this constituted no preference.
In view of the contrary decision laid down later in i93o in Mortgage Co.
v. Townsend, supra note 56, and of the case of Rice v. Columbia, supra note 4,
which in 1928 held that a pledge to secure a public deposit made while the bank
was insolvent was void, it is doubtful whether this Peurifoy case can be taken
as law even in its own jurisdiction.
1 "Reimbursement" is the right of the trustee after he has discharged a
liability properly incurred in the administration of the trust to be recouped
therefor. "Exoneration" is the right not to be compelled to discharge such a
liability out of his own private property. Scott, Liabilities Incurred in the
Administration of Trusts (1914) 28 HARV. L. REV. 725, 730.
In the relations between the trustee and the trust estate, the trustee's rights
to reimbursement and exoneration are co-existent. "Indemnity is not necessarily given by repayment after payment. Indemnity requires that the party
to be indemnified shall never be called upon to pay . . ." Buckley, L. J., in
In re Richardson, [1911] 2 K. B. 705, 715; Blundell v. Blundell, 40 Ch. D. 370,
376 (1888).
The general proposition is that "Trustees have an inherent equitable right
to be reimbursed all expenses which they reasonably and properly incur in the
execution of the trust, and it is immaterial that there are no provisions for such
expenses in the instrument of trust. If a person undertakes an office for
another in relation to property, he has a natural right to be reimbursed all the
money necessarily expended in the performance of the duty. And for losses
that may accrue to himself in the proper administration of the trust." 2 PERRY,
TRUSTS (7th ed. 1929) § 910.
See SEARS, TRUST ESTATES AS BUSINESS COMPANIES (2d ed. 1921) 58 ff.
2Baker v. Tibbetts, 162 Mass. 468, 39 N. E. 350 (1895); O'Toole v.
Faulkner, 29 Wash. 544, 70 Pac. 58 (19o2); see Taylor v. Davis, nio U. S.
330, 334, 4 Sup. Ct. 147, 150 (1884).
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the trust to the contrary, 3 the trustee and not the cestui que trust 4

or the trust res,5 is primarily responsible for contracts made in the
administration of the estate,6 or for torts committed either by the
trustee 7 or by his agent," in the execution of the trust. For this
reason the question as to when a trustee may be indemnified by the
trust estate, or by the beneficiary if the former is not sufficient,0 is
'Dantzler

v. McInnis, I5I Ala. 293, 44 So. i93 (19o7); cf. Birdsong v.

Jones, 2 Mo. App. 768, 8 S. W. (2d) 98 (1928) (in tort
trustee, as such, declaration alleged that the trust instrument
liability incurred in the operation of the trust estate should be
trust estate; held, demurrer overruled).
'Falardeau v. Boston Art Students' Ass'n, 182 Mass. 5o4,

action against
provided that
paid from the

65 N. E. 797

(1903).
'Hussey

v. Arnold, 185 Mass. 202, 70 N. E. 87 (i9O4) (in action against
trustee, trust property not subject to attachment or execution); O'Brien v.
Jackson, 167 N. Y. 31, 6o N. E. 238 (i9Ol); Jennings v. Mather, [i9o2] I
K. B. I.

The reason being that in an action at law against the trustee, the legatees
or beneficiaries interested in the estate have no opportunity of being heard.
An action against the trustee, as trustee, has been held not to state a cause
of action. O'Brien v. Jackson, supra (contract) ; Parmenter v. Barstow, 22
R. 1. 245, 47 At. 365 (19oo) (tort).
The trustee can, of course, make a contract whereby he avoids personal
liability. Thayer v. Wendell, I Gall. 37 (U. S. C. C. Ist, 1812) (as trustee,
"but not otherwise"). "Where a party contracts in a particularand not a personal capacity, it is of no consequence, as to the legal result, whether, supposing
no remedy can be had against him personally, none will lie against another",
Story, J., in Thayer v. Wendell, supra: at 40. But the mero words "as trustee"
will not have that effect, but will be treated merely as descriptio personae or
surplusage. Duvall v. Craig, infra note 6; Shepard v. Creamer, i6o Mass. 496,
36 N. E. 475 (894) ; I PERRY, TRUSTS § 437b.
'Duvall v. Craig, 2 Wheat. 45 (U. S. 1817) ; Blewitt v. Olin, 14 Daly 351

(N. Y. i888) (with authority) ; Fehlinger v. Wood, 134 Pa. 517, ig At. 746
(i89o) (without authority) ; 40 L. R. A. (N. s.) 201 (1912).
And, of course, where the trustee "has incurred the outlay not in the strict
line of his duty and without either the request or the implied assent of the
Cestuis que trust", LEWIN, TRUSTS (I3th ed. 1928) 473, there is no right to
indemnity. Collinson v. Lister, 20 Beav. 356 (1855); Hosegood v. Pedler, 66
L. J. Q. B. 18 (1896) ; Ecclesiastical Commissioners v. Pinney, [i9oo] 2 Ch.
736 (C. A.).

Nor even where the cestui que trust knew and approved of the

acts of the trustee. Leedham v. Chawner, 4 K. & J.458 (1858).

O'Malley v. Gerth, 67 N. J. L. 610, 52 At. 563 (192) ; Gillick v. Jackson,
40 Misc. 627, 83 N. Y. Supp. 29 (9o3) ; Prager v. Gordon, 78 Pa. Super. 76
(1921).

'Wahl v. Schmidt, 307 Ill. 301, 138 N. E. 604 (1923); Ballou v. Farnum,
9 Allen 47 (Mass. 1864) ; Baker v. Tibbetts; O'Toole v. Faulkner, both supra
note 2.

But a receiver appointed by the court is not liable for torts of his agent in
carrying out the receivership, because the receiver is himself but the agent of
the court.
9
Where the trustee has incurred the liability at the request of the beneficiary
there is certainly a right to indemnity against the beneficiary. Balsh v. Hyhan,
2 P. Wins. 453 (1728); Wells-Stone Co. v. Aultman, 9 N. D. 52o, 84 N. W.
373 (i9oo) ; cf. Pheni v. Gillan, 5 Hare I (1845). "It is a rule that the cestui

que trust ought to save the trustee harmless, as to all damages relating to the

NOTES

most important to the trustee. It is also of moment to creditors of
the trustee as such because of the generally accepted rule that where
the remedy against the trustee is not sufficient, the creditor succeeds
to the rights of the trustee against the trust estate. 10 So that, where
the trustee is insolvent or out of the jurisdiction, the creditor may
recover from the trust estate if the trustee could have been reimbursed
for, or exonerated from, the same claim; i. e., if on an accounting
the balance between the trustee and the beneficiary would have been
in favor of the trustee."' The minority common law view,' 2 upheld
by Pennsylvania and Georgia, allows the third party creditor to
recover from the trust estate, where the trustee had the authority to
act, regardless of the state of accounts between the trustee and the
trust, so within the reason of that rule, where the plaintiff the trustee has honestly and fairly, without any possibility of being a gainer, laid down money, by
which the defendant the cestui que trust is discharged from being liable for the
whole money lent, or from a plain and great hazard of being so, the plaintiff
ought to be repaid", Balsh v. Hyhan, supra, at 455.
Likewise, where the beneficiary is also the settlor. Ex parte Chippendale,
4 De G. M. & G. ig (x853). "Where parties place others in the position of
trustee for them, they are in equity personally bound to indemnify them against
the consequences resulting from that position", Ex parte Chippendale, supra,
at 54.
And even where no promise, express or implied, can be inferred, the cestui
que trust has been held liable for indemnity on the ground that he who receives
the benefits must bear the burden. Hardoon v. Belilios, [igoi] A. C. 118; cf.
In re Bosworth, 58 L. J.Ch. 432 (1889); see Falmouth Bank v. Cape Cod
Ship Canal Co., I66 Mass. 55o, 567, 44 N. E. 617, 619 (x896). Contra: Coffman
v.
Gates,
I1O Mo. App. 475, 85 S. W. 657 (19o4) ; cf. Fraser v. Murdock, 6 App.
Cas.
855 (i88i).
Nor does a change of beneficiaries with their assent, relieve the original
beneficiaries; and where there are several beneficiaries, they must share the
indemnity pro rata. Matthews v. Ruggles-Brise, [1911] 1 Ch. 194 semble.
Also see Note (igoo) 14 HARv. L. REV. 539; and cf. Hazard v. Coyle,

26

R. I. 361, 58 Atl. 987 (igo4) ; Cruse v. Paine, L. R. 6 Eq. 641, L. R. 4 Ch. 441
(1868) ; Lacey v. Hill, L. R. 18 Eq. 182 (1874).
"o
Or even from the cestui que trust where the trust estate is insufficient.
Poland v. Beal, 192 Mass. 559, 78 N. E. 728 (19o6) ; Wells-Stone Co. v. Aultman, supra note 9. In both of these cases there is a warrantable inference that
the cestuis que trustent promised to pay liability incurred by the trustees, by
their requests or assent to the acts of the trustees. It is submitted, however,
that where there is no such promise by the beneficiary, then the beneficiary
should not be personally liable because the trustee is in no .sense the general
agent of the beneficiary; and the creditor's right, be he tort or contract creditor,
should be limited to going against the trust estate.
" Stone, A Theory of Liability of Trust Estates for the Contracts and
Torts of the Trustee (1922) 22 Co. L. REv. 527, 528 and cases cited; Note
(i9i8) I8 COL L. REv. 73; (1915) 29 HARV. L. REV. 885.
Contra: Ewing v. Foley, i15 Tex. 222, 280 S. W. 499 (1926) ; Kerr,

Liability of the Trust Estate for Torts of the Trustee's Servant (1926) 5 TEX.
L. REv. 368.
-In some jurisdictions, by statute, the creditor may recover directly from
the trust estate regardless of the trustee's right to indemnity. 22 CoL. L. REv.
529, 11.4.
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estate, on the theory that as the trust estate obtains the benefit of the
trustee's acts it should bear the burden."'
Courts of equity have always been the protectors of trust estates
and will not allow them to be impaired or dissipated through the
negligence of trustees; and the trustee is held to a strict accountability
in all his dealings with the res,'4 the classic statement of the rule being
that "a trustee ought to conduct the business of the trust in the same
manner that an ordinary prudent man of business would conduct his
own . .

." "

Accordingly, when the trustee's acts in the execution

of the trust are proper and necessary, 6 then he is entitled to be inAnd this right of recoupment
in so conducting the trust affairs.'
'Miller v. Smythe, 92 Ga. 154. 18 S. E. 46 (1893) (tort); Manderson's
Appeal, 113 Pa. 631, 6 Atl. 893 (1886) (attorney's fee) ; Yerkes v. Richards,
170 Pa. 346, 32 Atl. lo89 (1895) (contract) ; see Mathews v. Stephenson, 6 Pa.
(tort;
496, 500 (1847); cf. Prinz v. Lucas, 2IO Pa. 620, 6o Att. 309 (195o)

trust instrument provided that trustees were not to be liable for negligence).
And see Scott, Liabilities Incurred in the Administration of Trusts (1914)
28 HARV. L. REv. 725; Brandeis, Liability of Truest Estates on Contracts Made
for Their Benefit (1881) 15 Aar. L. REv. 449.
"So much so that a trustee has been described as "a functionary from
whom the law exacts so much prudence, though, if at all prudent, he would not
have been found to fill that office." 21 IR. L. T. 155, 156 (1887). And see 118
L. T. 299 (1904) ; 136 L. T. 398 (1913) ; 40 CENT. L. J. 72 (1895) ; Sedgwick,
Trustees as Tort-Feasors (188o) 14 Ait. L. REv. 36; 26 L. J. 133 (1891).
' Jessel, M. R., in In re Speight, Speight v. Gaunt, 22 Ch. D. 727, 739
(1881) (holding that trustee is not liable to beneficiary for loss caused by tort
of agent where the trustee has acted reasonably in employing the agent). To
which Lord Lindley added, "not to take such care only as a prudent man would
take if he had only himself to consider. It is rather to take such care as an
ordinarily prudent man would take if he were minded to make an investment
for other people for whom he felt morally bound to provide." 118 L. 3. 299
(19o4).
Where, however, the trustee does act in good faith in a reasonable and
prudent manner, he will not be liable to the cesihi que trnst for the negligence
or default of an agent. Speight v. Gaunt, supra; Note (1929) 43 HARV. L.
REv. 1122, 1123 and cases cited; see Alward, Duties and Liabilities of Trustees
(1899) 19 CAN. L. T. 299; 2 PERRY, TRUSTS § 914.
16What is necessary and proper depends largely upon the terms of the trust
instrument and the nature of the trust. 2 PERRY, TRUSTS § 913. E. g., concerning repairs, see 22 IR. L. T. 84 (1888) ; 84 L. T. 149 (1887).

demnified for all expenses, including the costs of litigation,17 incurred

' The difficulty arises in deciding what is "properly incurred." Chiles v.
Robinson, 224 Ky. 71, 5 S. W. (2d) 269 (1928) (counsel fees allowed);
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Hicks, 9 F. (2d) 848 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925)
(trustee not allowed reimbursement for counsel fees and costs of unsuccessful
litigation to recover trust estate). Cf. Manderson's Appeal, siupra note ii;
(1926) 75 U. OF PA. L. REV. 177; 51 I. L. T. 233 (917); 144 L. T. 123
(1918) ; 62 SOL. 3. 227 (1917).
'U. S. v. Swope, 16 F. (2d) 215 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Wade v. Citizens'

State Bank, 165 Minn. 396, 2o6 N. W. 728 (1925) (trustee of constructive
trust in entitled to reimbursement for amounts paid in protecting the trust
estate).
"The questions whether a certain expenditure by a trustee may properly
be made by him and whether he will be reimbursed therefor upon his accounting are the same in legal effect." BOGERT, TRUSTS (1921) 376.

NOTES
is accorded recognition to the extent that the trustee is given a
"lien" 20 on the trust estate, and he can not be obliged to transfer it
from his possession until his proper claims against the estate are
paid.20 An exception appears in the cases of trustees for clubs and
charities, where it has been held that the trustee has no right to reimbursement against the cestuis que trustent
in the former, 2 1 and no
22
lien on the trust property in the latter.
In the situation respecting tort liability of the trustee an exception is to be noted in the case of charities, where there is a conflict
of authorities.23 When the injury has been caused by the actual fault
"Exception has been taken to the term "lien" when the rights of the
creditors against the trust estate are in question, by Mr. Justice Brandeis, then
Mr. Brandeis, Liabilitiesof Trust Estates for Contracts Mllade for Their Benefit
(i88i) 15 Ama. L. REV. 449, 458-9, and by Mr. Justice Stone, then Dean Stone,
A Theory of Liability of Trust Estates for the Contracts and Torts of the
Trustee (1922) 22 CoL L. REv. 527, 53o-6. where it is contended that "power
to apply trust funds for proper and necessary purposes" is a better term than
"lien", "right to reimbursement", or "right to indemnity".
' Turton v. Grant, 86 N. J. Eq. 191, 96 Atl. 993, ioo At. 979 (1916);
Percy v. Huyck, 252 N. Y. 168, 169 N. E. 127 (1929) ; Morison v. Morison, 7
De G. M. & G. 214 (1855) ; see Jessup v. Smith, 223 N. Y. 2o3, 2o7, 119 N. E.
403, 404; 3 PO-mEROY, EQ. JuR. (4th ed. 118) § io85.
'Wise

v. Perpetual Trustee Co., [1903] A. C. 139 (trustees of a club may

have a lien on club property, dicta 148, but the cestuis que trustent must not
indemnify them on the ground that clubs are associations of a peculiar nature,
not partnerships or associations for gain, and are formed on the fundamental
condition, not usually expressed bout understood by everyone; which feature
distinguished them from other societies, that no member as such becomes liable
to pay to the funds of the society or to anyone else any money beyond the subscription required by the rules of the club to be paid so long as he remains a
member) ; cf. Stikeman v. Flack, 175 N. Y. 5.2, 67 N. E. lO84 (9o3), rez'g 58
App. Div. 277, 68 N. Y. Supp. iou (igoi); see Note (1903) 3 COL L. REV.
407. But see Williams, Club Trustee's Right to Indemnity: A Criticism of
Wise v. Perpetual Trustee Co. Ltd. (1903) ig L. Q. REv. 386; Book Review
(1903) 17 HARv. L. Ray. 141; Laski, The Personality of Associatimns (1915)
29 HARv. L. REv. 4o4, at 420.

It is interesting to note that the decision of Wise v. Perpetual Trustee Co.
is by Lord Lindley, who only two years previously had held in Hardoon v.
Belilios, supra note 9, that the cestui que trust must indemnify the trustee on
the ground that he who gets the benefit must bear the burden.
- At least where enforcement of the lien would destroy the trust and the
lien was never claimed or intended to exist by the trustee during his lifetime.
French, Adm'r v. Trustees of Griswold College et al., 6o Iowa 482, 15 N. V.
273 (1883), the court distinguishing between charitable trusts and ordinary
business or pecuniary trusts.
'The majority rule is that a charity is liable to strangers for the torts of
its servants. Gallon v. House of Good Shepard, 158 Mich. 361, 122 N. W. 631
(igog) ; Van Ingen v. Jewish Hospital, 99 Misc. 655, 164 N. Y. Supp. 832
(1917), aff'd 227 N. Y. 665, 126 N. E. 924 (192o) ; Gilbert v. Trinity House,
17 Q. B. D. 795 (1886).
The minority view is that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not
apply to charities, for reasons of public policy. Fordyce v. Woman's Christian
Nat. Library Ass'n, 79 Ark. 55o, 96 S. W. 155 (i9o6) ; Loeffler v. Sheppard &
E. P. Hospital, 130 Md. 265, IOO Att. 301 (1917); Fire Ins. Patrol v. Boyd,

120 Pa. 624, 15 Ati. 553 (1888); WVildoner v. Central Poor District, 267 Pa.
375, i1O At. 175 (1920) ; Paterlini v. Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 247 Fed. 639
(C. C. A. 3d, 1918) ; see 14 A. L. R. 572 (1921).
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of the trustee it is not hard to understand the fact that he has no

right to indemnity."4 A trustee, however, may appoint an agent when
2
it is necessary and usual to do so.-"
and he is not responsible to the
beneficiary for loss caused by the negligence or default of the agent. 0
So that where the injury is due to the tort of an agent of the trustee
and the trustee has acted properly 27 in appointing the agent and is
himself without fault, then, in spite of the principal and agent relationship between the trustee and his employee and the fact that the
trust estate is not benefited by the injury to the third person, he should
not bear the loss.
In the recent case of In re Lathers' Will (In re O'Gorman) 2'
the trustee had properly appointed an agent to manage trust property,
an apartment house; third persons, who were injured as the result
of the agent's negligence, recovered judgments against the trustee;
and the trustee, after satisfying the judgments, was allowed reimbursement out of the trust fund. The court felt no hesitancy in so
deciding, although there is only one preceding case squarely on
point. 2 1' The underlying reason for the courts not going out of their
2 The theory of the courts is that as the trustee has no authority in his
official capacity to do wrong, a wrongful act is therefore in excess of his
authority and is consequently the personal tort of the trustee. Prager v. Gordon,
supra note 7. Accordingly, where there has b-en negligence in the management
of the trust estate resulting in injury to third persons, the cases are almost
unanimous in holding the estate not liable on the ground that the negligence
was the personal tort of the trustee. 44 A. L. R. 637 (1926). Contra: Ewing
v. Foley, supra note io. Cf. Litchfield v. White, 7 N. Y. 438 (1852).
Parker v. Johnson, 37 N. J. Eq. 366 (1883); Kennedy's Appeal, 4 Pa.
149 (1846) ; Henderson v. M'Iver, 3 Madd. 275 (818) ; Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 2 Sim. & Stu. 237 (1825).
'Supra note 15. The general rule is that "trustees are liable only for
good faith and common prudence" and not for a loss to the trust estate where
they have acted thus properly. Twaddell's Appeal, 5 Pa. 15 (1846) ; Neff's
Appeal, 57 Pa. 91 (1868) ; 2 PERRY, TRUSTS § 914.
'Where the trustee does not exercise proper care in his selection of an
agent, and loss results, he is liable to the beneficiary. Robinson v. Harkin,
[1896] 2 Ch. 415. Likewise, where the trustee fails to use due care in the
supervision of the agent. McCloskey v. Gleason, 56 Vt. 264 (883) ; cf. Earle
v. Earle, 93 N. Y. 104 (1833).
2137
Misc. 226, 243 N. Y. Supp. 366 (1930).
' Benett v. Wyndham, 4 De G. F. & J. 259 (1862), Knight Bruce, L. J.,
saying, at 263, "The trustee in this case appears to have meant well, to have
acted with due diligence, and to have employed a proper agent to do an act the
directing which to be done was within the due discharge of his duty. The agent
makes a mistake, the consequences of which subject the trustee to legal liability
to a third party. I am of opinion that this liability ought, as between the trustee
and the estate, to be borne by the estate."
And see In re Hunter, 151 Fed. 904, 906 (E. D. Pa. 1907) ; Powers v.
Mass. Homoeopathic Hospital, io9 Fed. 294, 300 (C. C. A. ist, i9oi) ; Miller v.
Smythe, 92 Ga. 154, i58, i8 S. E. 46, 47 (0893) ; Wahl v. Schmidt, 307 Ill. 331,
339, 138 N. E. 604. 607 (1923) ; Willetts v. Schuyler, 3 Ind. App. 118, 120, 29
N. E. 273, 274 (189i) ; Bruce v. Central M. E. Church, 147 Mich. 230, 240,
254, 110 N. \V. 951, 953 1907) ; Kellogg v. Church Charity Foundation, 128
App. Div. 214, 217, 112 N. Y. Supp. 566, 570 (19o8) ; Morgan's Estate, 2 Pa.
Dist. 816, 817 (i891) ; Parmenter v. Barstow, 22 R. 1. 245, 247, 47 Atl. 365,

NOTES

way in this situation to favor the cestui que trust is probably that
although a trustee is strictly bound to account to the court and the
beneficiary for the management of the trust estate, yet any reason to
hold him for liability without fault is overweighed by a balancing
of interests inasmuch as to do so would cause responsible persons to
refuse to be trustees, which would be to the detriment of all concerned." °
It would appear, therefore, that while there is some confusion
in the application of the finer distinctions, still the basis and fundamentals of the field of law which allows a trustee reimbursement
and exoneration are founded upon just and sound principles, logically
consistent with the other branches of the law of trusts.
J.B.
366 (igoo); Ewing v. Foley, 115 Tex. 222, 234, 280 S. W. 499, 502 (1926);
I); re Raybould, [i9oo] i Ch. 199.
It has even been held that public or statutory trustees may be reimbursed
from parish accounts for liability incurred from the tort of an agent. AttorneyGeneral v. Pearson, 2 Coll. 581 (1846) ; see 46 JUST. PEACE 593 (1882). It is
submitted, however, that the proper understanding of such a situation is that
the decision is the result of the underlying feeling that, although government
cannot be sued without its consent, yct it should bear the burden for injuries
caused by its agents.
'Jessel, M. R., in Speight v. Gaunt, supra note 15, at 746, "Where you
have an honest trustee fairly anxicus to do his duty and to do as he thinks best
for the estate, you are not to strain the law against him to make him liable for
doing that which he has done and which he believes is right in the execution
of his duty, without you have a plain cause made against him. . . . You are
to endeavor as far as possible, having regard to the whole transaction, to avoid
making an honest man who is not paid (in England a trustee is not paid for
his services in the absence of an express provision by the settlor. LEwiN,
TRUSTS 455. While in almost all of the United States the trustee is paid.
2 PERRY, TRUSTS §§ 916, 917) for the performance of an unthankful office
liable for the failure of other people from whom he receives no benefit."

